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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

of daiigerous appliances applies in the case where an automobile is
hired to an independent contractor.2 9 Nevertheless, as was said in
Stapleton v. Independent,3 ° "If the owner of such agency (referring
to an automobile) consents to turn it over to the control of an incompetent or reckless chauffeur he is not deprived of any legal right
in holding him liable for its negligent operation when in such control and a greater degree of safety to the general public is likely to
follow. * * * The owner of an automobile is supposed to know, and
should know, about the qualifications of the persons he allows to use
his car, to drive his auto, and if he has doubts of the competency or
Garefulness of the driver he should refuse to give his consent to the
use by him of the machine." It is this reasoning which has prompted
the several State Legislatures to enact the statutes which, in effect,
create "double-barrelled" liability against the owner besides the driver
in favor of an injured plaintiff.
L. L. W.
EXAMINATION BEFORE TRIAL.-Section 288 of the Civil Practice Act

provides in part that: "Any party to an action in a court of record may
cause to be taken by deposition, before trial, his own testimony or that
of another party which is material and necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." The section also goes on to say: "A party to such
an action may cause to be so taken the testimony, which is material and
necessary of the original owner of a claim which constitutes, or from
which arose, a cause of action acquired by an adverse party by grant,
conveyance, transfer, assignment or endorsement and which is set forth
in his pleading as a cause of action or counterclaim." * * *
This section substantially differs frrom the code of Civil Procedure
in that now all parties are subject to examinations, and makes it incumbent on the objector to apply to the court for an order to vacate the
notice of examination inasmuch as the purpose of this section is to remove all procedural trammels and permit examinations with. as few
restrictions as possible. It was necessary under the code, however, for
the moving party to prove circumstances which would authorize such
examination, the theory being that ordinarily parties were not subject
to examination.'
"9Burbank v. Bethel Steam, 75 Me. 373 (18-3); Whitney v. Clifford,
46 Wis. 138, 49 N. W. 835 (1879); Powell v. Virginia Const. Co., 88 Tenn.
692, 13 S.W. 691 (1890) ; Cunningham v. International, 51 Texas 503 (1879) ;
"The only obligation on the part of an employer in reference to tools or
appliances supplied is to exercise due care not to let the contractor have
an appliance which is a nuisance or is apparently defective or likely to cause
injury to third persons." 14 R. C. L. 84-85.
' Supra, note 6.
'200 App. Div. 206, 191 N. Y. Supp. 848 (2nd Dept. 1922).

NOTES AND COMMENT
At common law a party to an action could not call his adversary as
2
a witness at the trial and examine him. This was a privilege for the
party opponent in civil actions at common law. The party was disqualified as a witness because of his interest in his own behalf and was,
accordingly not obligated to testify at the behest of his opponent. Now,
8
however, both the disqualification and the privilege have been abolished.
But even before this very obvious defect was corrected by statute,
equity alive to the weakness of the situation permitted what was known
as the "bill of discovery," which in substance was a right given to a
litigant in a common law action solely for the purpose of subjecting
his adversary to an examination under oath and the action at law might
4
be stayed until such examination could be had. The bill of discovery
is now no longer recognized in this state 5 and substituted for it is "the
deposition of the first class," more commonly known as "the examination
before trial." 6
It follows therefor that a real test to decide whether a party has
a right to an examination before trial is to determine whether under the
same circumstances the moving party under common law would be entitled to a "bill of discovery." 7
The "bill of discovery" could be had only if the moving party was in
good faith. Hence good faith is an indispensable requisite for an examination.8 This good faith is evidenced only if the testimony sought
to be elicited upon examination be "material and necessary" 9 to the
cause of the party seeking the examination. One requirement obviously includes the other. The court, however, may prevent examination where it shall deem "by any reason that the interests of justice
would not be subserved by such an examination." 9a
In the Appellate Division First Department of this state, it is uniformly settled that an examination before trial may not be had for the
10
It is incumbent upon the
purpose of discovering who should be sued.
plaintiff to show that he has a cause of action before an examination is
granted." Likewise if it be the defendant who wishes to examine he
2
must be able to show that he has a valid defense.'
' Carmody's N. Y. Prac. Sec. 345.
'C. P. A. Sec. 346.
'Carmody's N. Y. Prac. Sec. 345.
C. P. A. Sec. 345.
864 N. Y. 120.
'Carmody's N. Y. Prac. Sec. 348.
'188 App. Div. 714, 177 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dept. 1919).
' C. P. A. Sec. 288; 299; Civil Prac. Rule 122.
" Carmody's N. Y. Prac. Sec. 344.
1095 App. Div. 417 (lst Dept. 1904); Schull v. Snitzer State Bank, 196
App. Div. 934 (1st Dept. 1921).
' 201 App. Div. 512, 194 N. Y. Supp. (lst Dept. 1922) ; N.B. Rule different
in 2nd department, 123 App. Div. 814, 161 N. Y. Supp. 1116 (2nd Dept. 1908).
"208 App. Div. 107, 203 N. Y. Supp. 942 (1st Dept. 1924).
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It is the general rule in this state that a party may examine his
adversary only in respect of those matters which the moving party has
the burden of proof. 13 The converse of this proposition is very clearly
pointed out by the court in the case of Sied! v. Newkirk 14 thru Clark,
J. when he stated: "It is quite apparent that the matters defendant
alleges that he expects to disprove by plaintiffs' evidence are the very
matters that the plaintiff must prove to make out his prima facie case.
Plaintiff must prove those matters by his own testimony and if he fails
to prove them he has no cause of action. Defendant is not attempting
to obtain testimony to establish his defense. What he is endeavoring
to accomplish is the cross examination of the plaintiff before trial about
his own case. Where it is obvious that every particle of material
testimony about which the defendantfwishes to interrogate the plaintiff,
is that which the plaintiff himself must first establish, he is not entitledto an examination before trial."
To the general rule, however, there are two notable exceptions: 1st
-where there is a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship existing, a
plaintiff may be examined even as to those matters which plaintiff must
prove; a fortiori when facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
adverse party;15 2nd in negligence cases where an examination of the
defendant on the issue of defendant's negligence, which is part of the
plaintiff's affirmative case, would almost certainly result in a very grave
abuse and amount in little more than a cross examination of defendant
in advance of the trail on his version of the occurrence which gave rise
to the injury complained of-then an examination is permitted (in the
1st Dept.), but, limited to questions of ownership of the premises or
control of the device which caused the injury.",
The purpose of an examination before trial is to obtain evidence to
use upon trial . 7 But the taking of examinations to properly prepare for
trial or to obtain other evidence to meet the defense, are reasons not
8
sufficient to justify the examination of an adverse party.'
Care should be taken lest one confuses the examination before
trial with "discovery and inspection." The distinction is well pointed out
19
in Singer v. National Gum and Meca Co.' where the court thru Fruch,
I held that on examination of an adverse party before trial, the books,
" 188 App. Div. 23, 176 N. Y. Supp. 406 (2nd Dept. 1919) ; 200 App. Div.
485, 193 N. Y. Supp 97 (1st Dept. 1922); 215 App. Div. 724; 206 App. Div.
287, 200 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st Dept. 1923).
"148 App. Div. 864 (1st Dept. 1912).
188 App. Div. 23 (2nd Dept. 1919).
"Carmody's N. Y. Prac. Sec. 350; 126 N. Y. S. 628; 201 App. Div. 433,
194 N. Y. Supp. 531 (1st Dept. 1922).
"N. Y. S. 529 (1903).
114 N. Y. S. 473 (1909) ; see also 125 App. Div. 651 (2nd Dept. 1908).
"211 App. Div. 758, 207 N. Y. Supp. 921 (1st Dept. 1925).

NOTES AND COMMENT
papers and documents produced are merely an incident to the examination of the adverse party, that their inspection and perusal is not the
primary object of the examiner; that the party who produces them retains control over them but can be required to answer questions relating
to their contents; that on such examination the examining party may
inspect any book and paper which contains entries relative to subject
matter of the examination but his inspection is limited to specific entries or accounts to which reference is made by the witness and the
examiner is not permitted to roam at will thru the books, papers and
documents so produced; whereas in those actions where discovery and
inspection is allowed a general perusal of the books, papers and documents is contemplated and that such perusal is not an incident to the
20
examination but an end in itself.
Notice of the proposed examination by the moving party to his adversary should state the person before whom the testimony is to be
taken; the time and place of taking; the name or names of the person
or persons to be examined, and the matters upon which the person or
.persons are to be examined. 21 It is now the custom for the moving
party to make his office the place where the examination is to be
held.
In the event the plaintiff fails to appear for an examination before
trial on notice for said examination, it has been held 22 that the proceedings will be stayed until the plaintiff does appear for examination.
But on the other hand, if defendant fails to appear for examination
before trial, when served with notice to appear the Appellate Division,
First Department has held it to be a reversible error to strike out the
defendant's answer and give judgment for plaintiff, since the statute
23
imposes no such penalty.
On a motion to vacate the notice for examination before trial,2 4
the burden of proof rests on him who seeks to examine. He must show
that he is entitled to such examination.25 The service of notice of
motion to vacate will, however, operate as a stay to the taking of the
26
proposed examination.
The examination before trial, in conclusion makes it possible for
the admissibility of a vast amount of evidence at the time of trial, which
without such procedure would be unavailable because of the manifest
.- See also Carmody's N. Y. Prac. Sec. 378; 205 App. Div. 705, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 752 (1st Dept. 1923).
' C. P. A. Sec. 290 et seq.
'207 App. Div. 225, 201 N. Y. Supp. 757 (1st Dept. 1923).
206 App. Div. 194, 200 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1st Dept. 1923).
2Rule 124 C. P. A.
209 App. Div. 169, 204 N. Y. Supp. 308 (2nd Dept. 1924).
C. P. A. Sec. 291.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
inability of securing it. For example, the subpoena would be inadequate
in ascertaining in advance that which an adverse party alone knew
and which would be material and necessary in establishing a cause of
action or defense. A notice to produce, on the other hand, is of
value only when the moving party knows what he wants and can introduce secondary evidence, in case, after a notice to produce, the ad27
verse party fails to produce the primary evidence.
These shortcomings were fortunately averted when statute created
the existing procedural form of "the examination before trial," a
requisite for astute litigators.
V. J. M.

WHEN Am ASSIGNMENT MAY BE A SuB-LEAsE---The familiar proposition that the transfer by lessee of the entire term of his lease,
results in a so-called "assignment" rather than a "sub-lease," has
been subjected to considerable reservation. There are three ways
in which the question ordinarily comes before the court. It is submitted that the aim of the suit and the parties at the Bar create*
equities,' which affect the determination, so that we reach a result
in which the terms "assignment" or "sub-lease" are merely convenient instruments, legal fictions perhaps, by which the Courts arrive
at equitable results. The most convenient way of treating this subject,
will be by discussing seriatim, the three ways in which the question
usually arises. First, in an action by the landlord against the tenant in
possession, the transferee of the term, the instrument is called an assignment and the tenant in possession held bound by the covenants in
the original lease, Stewart v. Long Island Railroad Co. 2 emphasizes
this proposition. Stewart leased certain property to the Central Railroad Co. for a period of fifty years. Later the lease was assigned to
the Flushing, North Shore and Central Railroad Co. Then the latter
company leased to the defendant the whole of the property covered by
the Stewart lease for a term of ninety-nine years. The plaintiff brings
this action for rent, and claims that the defendant is liable as assignee
of the lease. The defendant contends it is not liable on the ground that
it is a sub-lessee. The court said, "Where a lessee of land leases the
same land to a third party, the question has often arisen whether the
second lease is in legal effect an assignment of the original lease, or a
mere sub-lease. The question has frequently and probably most generally, arisen between the lessee and his transferee, and much confuCarmody's N. Y. Prac. Sec. 342.
'Linden v. Hepburn, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 668; O'Connell v. Sugar Products
Co., 114 Misc. 540 (1st Dept. 1921).
2102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200 (1886) ; Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129
Ill. 318, 21 N. E. 920 (1889).

